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Abstract 
 
The scientific environment might influence university researchers’ job designs. In a principal–agent 
model, researchers must choose between substitutable tasks, publishing or teaching, according to 
their individual abilities and the scientific and pedagogical context that exists in their universities. 
This proposed model shows that scientific production can increase, regardless of researchers’ 
abilities, if the scientific environment favours agglomeration effects. The authors test these 
predictions using an original data set of French economics professors that reveals their individual 
investments in both teaching and publishing. The econometric results confirm that the tasks conflict 
and that the scientific context affects researchers’ investments in each task. 
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1. Introduction 
As the pioneering works by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) showed, academic research is 
essential to the production of knowledge. Knowledge production in turn expands innovation 
and economic growth (Romer, 1990). Therefore, academic research represents an economic 
strategy, and many studies seek to understand what determines scientific production. Some 
studies address individual factors, such as the researcher’s age (Diamond, 1986; Stephan and 
Levin, 1997; Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003) or gender (Stephan, 1998). However, individual 
factors explain only a portion of observed differences in scientific production. Stephan 
(1996) recommends noting the collective nature of the research and the influences of 
laboratory characteristics, including its size (Adams and Griliches, 1996), its reputation (Cole 
and Cole, 1973; Allison and Long, 1990), and the quality of colleagues (Mairesse and Turner, 
2002; Lissoni et al., 2011). 
 
Most of these studies also focus on researchers in the United States. Yet other nations, such 
as France, feature university systems with institutional specificities (cf. U.S. universities) that 
affect their laboratories and scientific production. For example, academic research 
traditionally was financed by public funds, allocated mainly according to laboratory size 
rather than scientific production. Discussions of individual scientific production levels also 
have been limited mainly to topics related to careers and promotions. In contrast, recent 
reforms seek to improve universities’ autonomy (LRU law), create individual incentives for 
scientific production (research prizes, such as Prime d’Excellence Scientifique), and 
encourage universities to pursue fewer, more transversal projects to achieve agglomeration 
effects (Idex and Labex funding projects). These reforms thus create a need to evaluate 
individual scientific production and its determinants while also arousing concerns among 
French universities that face more research competition, even as they continue to work to 
pursue their educational missions. These reforms even could change how professors work—
more precisely, how they split their time between research and teaching activities. For 
example, publication incentives may lead some professors to spend more time in research 
than in teaching activities. 
 
Most research ignores the multidimensional nature of professors’ activities though. 
Researchers working in a given research context have a primary task: scientific production. 
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Yet professors in French universities also must teach at least 192 hours during every 
academic year. For Fox (1992), teaching and research activities conflict, such that time 
devoted to one activity decreases the time available for the other. Moreover, multitasking 
has strong impacts on organizations and incentives. According to Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991), when agents face multiple duties (in a principal–agent framework), incentives can 
increase their effort and help them efficiently allocate their time among their job activities.  
 
We therefore propose to study a multitasking setting to determine how professors allocate 
their time between research and teaching duties using a principal–agent model (Prasad, 
2009), in which professors are heterogeneous in abilities to research and teach. With this 
model, we introduce the effect of the scientific context on the time devoted to each task. In 
turn, we predict that professors must be assigned tasks according to their relative abilities 
but also that a dynamic scientific context can improve their individual production, whatever 
their abilities. 
 
We use an original data set to test these predictions. With our novel database, we observe, 
for a sample of French economics professors, their scientific production and their time 
investments in pedagogical and administrative duties. We also collect indicators of the 
institutional context, related to both research and pedagogy. With these data, we estimate a 
publication score and teaching hours simultaneously, using a three-step least squares 
methodology. The results clearly confirm our theoretical predictions: Research and teaching 
tasks are conflicting demands for professors, but a more favorable scientific context can 
improve their scientific production, whatever the professors’ abilities.  
 
We structure the remainder of this article as follows: The next part presents the principal–
agent model with multitasking and externalities due to the scientific context. After we detail 
the data we used to test our theoretical predictions, we present the empirical strategy and 
then discuss our results. Finally, we conclude with some implications and limitations. 
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2. Model 
A. General model 
We address a principal–agent problem in which the risk-neutral principal, the university, 
assigns two tasks to the risk-averse agents, the professors: teaching or management (T) and 
research (R). As in MacDonald and Marx (2001), tasks are substitutable to agents but 
complementary to the principal. Each agent therefore splits available time (normalized to 
one unit) between the two tasks, such that when    defines the amount of time devoted to 
research activities,       refers to the time devoted to teaching and managerial tasks. As 
Prasad (2009) and Thiele (2010) recognize, agents exhibit different skills with regard to 
conducting the two tasks. These task-specific abilities,   and  , influence the costs to agents 
to perform a task. Therefore, the cost function for a single agent   is given by: 
                  
 
We define three types of agents: a generalist and two specialists. A generalist faces the same 
costs to perform each task, so      . His or her costs function can be written as        . 
A teaching specialist instead faces a higher cost of performing research, so    . Finally, for 
a research specialist, we have     . 
 
In turn, for each task, the outcome is either a success (1) or a failure (0). The probability of 
success reflects the time spent on the activity. If both tasks fail, the principal obtains a 
minimal level of production  . If only one task succeeds, the principal obtains an output that 
depends on the time spent on this task. If the successful task involves research activities, the 
principal’s output is          . If instead teaching activities succeed, the output is 
             . In these latter cases,   and   are technological efficiency parameters 
that depend on the scientific, pedagogical, and administrative context. Finally, the principal 
obtains the maximal output when both tasks succeed, such that            
        . Thus, if specialized agents succeed, the principal obtains a lower output than if 
both tasks were successfully completed by generalists. Tasks are complementary to the 
principal. 
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The principal defines agents’ compensation by the vector                     
  , such that agents get paid   if the two activities fail,   +    if only teaching and 
managerial tasks succeeds,       if only research activities succeed, and        if 
both activities succeed. 
 
 Table 1 presents these outcomes, their associated probabilities, the principal’s outcomes 
(production), and the resulting contracts. 
 
Table 1: The principal–agent problem: a synthesis 
Outcomes (1,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0) 
Probabilities t(1-t) t2 (1-t)2 t(1-t) 
Production                             
Contracts                     
 
Furthermore, agents are risk averse and seek to maximize their expected utility. Let   be the 
agent’s utility function; it is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. For a 
given contract and time allocation, utility can be defined as:  
                        
         
       
                             
 
The principal’s expected profit is: 
                            
 
 
with   is the expected cost associated with the contract and time allocation. 
 
When agents have no private information (about abilities or time allocation), the principal–
agent problem is : 
                   
  subject to an individual rationality constraint:  
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With Proposition 1 we examine how the time devoted to research depends on the relative 
abilities of agents; the proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1: In a full-information framework, it is optimal for an agent to allocate more 
time to his or her low-cost activity. 
 
The optimal time devoted to research thus given by : 
            
  
   
   
 
   
 
 
     
                          
with             and         (see the Appendix).  
 
Next, consider what happens for each type of agent. 
 
a) Generalist (   ) 
For a generalist, which is the condition we use as a benchmark in the rest of this article, the 
optimal time for research is:   
  
  
     
   
 
b) Specialist in research (   ) 
For a specialist in research tasks, the optimal time for research is:  
  
    
  
  
     
 
with an upward limit at one. 
 
c) Specialist in teaching (   ) 
For a specialist in teaching and managerial activities, the optimal time for research is:  
  
    
  
  
     
 
with a slowdown limit at zero. 
 
With these equations, we can compare the optimal research times for the three profiles, 
which reveals     
    
    
 . A specialist devotes more time to the task that he is good for, 
compared to a generalist. A specialist devotes more time to the task that she or he is good 
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at, compared with a generalist. This result is more intuitive if we assume a and b are equal to 
1. In this case, as in Prasad (2009) and MacDonald and Marx (2001), a generalist splits her or 
his time equally across the two tasks, whereas a specialist rationally chooses to favor the less 
costly activity. Proposition 1 is in line with Fox’s (1992) findings, using data on U.S. 
researchers in four social sciences (economics, political science, psychology, and sociology), 
that more productive researchers spend less time teaching and more time in research 
activities.  
 
Finally, for the principal (university), it is optimal to assign professors to tasks according to 
their relative abilities: Those with better research skills should specialize in research, 
whereas those with poorer research abilities should combine research with managerial and 
teaching activities. This finding contradicts hierarchical theory (Sattinger, 1975; Rosen, 1982; 
Waldman, 1984) and proposes the most efficient workers should be assigned to managerial 
duties.  
 
These equilibrium properties derive from a general framework, in which the principal and 
agents have symmetric information. However, the principal might observe only the agents’ 
type, not their time allocations. In this asymmetric case, the principal must solve a moral 
hazard problem:  
                   
  subject to the individual rationality constraint:  
                  
as well as to the moral hazard constraint given by: 
                        
At the equilibrium, payments    are equal for all outcomes, so the individual rationality 
constraint depends on   only, through the cost function. We thus have:  
            
        
   
 
In the case of a generalist (   ), expected utility does not depend on   , so   
  
  
     
  . 
However, if agent   is a specialist, her or his expected utility is maximized when she or he 
devotes all her or his time to the personally less costly task. So if    , we obtain      
 8 
(research specialist) and if     , we have      (teaching and managerial activities 
specialist). These two solutions can be treated as the limiting cases for our general full 
information framework (Prasad, 2009).  
 
However, even in the asymmetric case, this general framework still assumes that agents’ 
production is perfectly independent of the institutional context. This individual-level 
approach to predicting academic production and research thus neglects the collective nature 
of research (Stephan, 1996). In the next section, we introduce the role of the scientific 
environment. 
 
B. Multitasking and the scientific environment 
Economics of science theory (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996; Stephan and Levin, 
1997) proposes accounting for collective, external influences on individual academic 
activities. For example, empirical evidence notes the influences of a laboratory’s or the 
department’s prestige on their researchers’ productivity (Cole and Cole, 1973; Long and 
McGinnis, 1981). For Allison and Long (1990), two complementary mechanisms can explain 
this result. First, more prestigious departments attract more productive researchers. Second, 
in these departments, research conditions are more favorable, due to spillovers and access 
to more funding or better equipment. Mairesse and Turner (2002) also show that colleagues’ 
performance increases individual productivity. Using French data from the National 
Research Council (CNRS), they find that a 10 percent increase the laboratory production 
induces 0.6 more published papers per researcher (per year). With the same data, Adam and 
Griliches (1996) find scale returns, such that department size produces a significant but small 
effect on individual productivity. Finally, the composition of the department (Carayol and 
Matt, 2004, 2006), defined by the presence of post-docs and the combination of full-time 
researchers and university professors, also may produce positive externalities.  
 
However, prior literature does not consider the multiple, conflicting demands on professors. 
In a multitasking context, spillovers due to the scientific environment could influence how 
professors split their available time. Following Griliches (1979), we anticipate that scientific 
production results from access to knowledge stocks, . Therefore, let            be 
individual research production. The stock of knowledge depends on the number of 
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researchers in the department and the time they devote to research tasks, such that  
    . Now suppose that               
In that case, we can write:        
 
Furthermore, in a full information context, the principal–agent problem becomes: 
                                       
  subject  to an individual rationality constraint:  
                  
 
With Proposition 2 we examine how the scientific environment affects the time devoted to 
research, with the proofs again provided in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: In a full-information framework, it is optimal for an agent to allocate more 
time to research when scientific externalities arise, whatever his or her relative ability, but 
only if the stock of knowledge in the department is sufficient. 
 
Therefore, the optimal time devoted to research in this case is given by : 
             
  
   
        
 
     
                          
with              and         
 
Then, we can outline the outcomes for each type of agent. 
 
a) Generalist (   ) 
For a generalist, the optimal time for research is:  
  
     
  
    
   
If we compare this optimal time with and without externalities, we find that    
     
 . 
 
Furthermore, we note that   
     
  if  
     
   
   . When the number of researchers in 
the department is greater than   , a generalist can devote more time to research tasks if 
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externalities are present (compared with a context without externalities). Finally,   
   has the 
following  properties:         
     and     
  
  
   
  
     
Graphically, we thus have: 
 
Graph 1: Stock of capital and time allocation of generalists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Graph 1 shows, externalities do not always incite generalists to devote more time to 
research. It depends on the number of researchers in the department. If    , spillovers 
inside the department lead generalists to specialize more in research. But below   , 
generalists are not incited to spent more time on research compared with a context without 
externalities.  
 
b) Specialist in research (   ) 
For someone who specializes in research tasks, in the presence of scientific externalities, the 
optimal time for research is :    
     
     
  
    
 
 
c) Specialist in teaching (   ) 
For someone who specializes in teaching and managerial activities, the optimal time for 
research with externalities is :     
     
     
  
    
 
 
 
N 
  
   
1 
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Finally, accounting for scientific externalities in a department does not affect the hierarchy 
of agents in terms of research time, because    
     
     
  . Externalities do not distort 
individual abilities to complete each task, but they do alter the time devoted to research for 
each type of agents, if the number of researchers in the laboratory exceeds a threshold   . 
The concentration of knowledge increases the time devoted to research activities, even if 
professors with greater teaching abilities spend less time on research than does a generalist 
or a research specialist, which suggests the existence of agglomeration effects for academics 
(Aghion, 2010). Our principal–agent model leads thus to two main conclusions: 
 • Tasks must be assigned according to relative individual abilities.  
 • The time devoted to research can be increased for all professors, whatever their 
abilities, when the laboratory size is sufficient, due to agglomeration externalities. 
 
3. Data 
Following our theoretical framework, we next test how professors allocate their available 
time in a multitasking context and whether this allocation changes with the scientific 
context. This empirical analysis clearly departs from extant literature, in that we do not focus 
solely on scientific production but also are interested in the pedagogical dimension, which 
often remains unobserved. 
 
Therefore, we built an original data set using administrative data from the French Ministry of 
Education. With these data, we can observe 240 full professors in economics department, 
each of whom participated in the first three national competitions (2009–2011) for the 
“Prime d’Excellence Scientifique” (PES). Introduced in 2009, the PES competition involves a 
search for the most productive professors in each discipline in the four years prior to the 
competition. Similar to a tournament, candidates get ranked on the basis of four criteria: 
scientific production, quality of PhD supervising, scientific responsibilities, and scientific 
reputation at national and international levels. To enter this competition, applicants provide 
their scientific production, their number of teaching hours per year, and their administrative 
duties, together with a curriculum vita that indicates their individual characteristics, 
including age, experience, and gender.  
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Before describing the tasks and individual attributes, we outline our sample. The 240 full 
professors in economics represent 44% of the total population, and their demographic 
characteristics are very similar to those of the overall population (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Sample and population of French economics professors  
 Population PES Sample 
Number 547 240 
% of male 
Age (in average) 
81,2% 
51,7 
77,9% 
49,2 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2011 
 
  However, the scientific and pedagogical activities of the full population are unobservable, so 
we cannot determine if full professors in our sample are totally representative of all full 
professors in economics. We suspect that participation in the PES competition is not random 
but instead depends on observed and unobserved attributes. Unfortunately we cannot 
address this selection problem; to correct it, we could need instrumental variables that 
could explain just participation in the competition, not our two key variables. The 
administrative data we use, though extensive and unique, are not rich enough to reveal such 
variables. Thus, our results must be discussed with caution, due to the risk of selection bias. 
  
  To measure scientific production, we used two indicators. A scientific production index, ips, 
is calculated as the number of articles published during the four years prior to the 
competition, weighted by the quality of the journal and number of co-authors. We counted 
all articles published in journals included in the economics journal categorization of the 
French National Scientific Research Committee (CNRS). We use this ranking (which only 
pertains to France) to account for the quality of publications. We adopt a decreasing five-
point score (5 = an article published in the most prestigious journals, 1 = a publication in the 
less prestigious journals). For each publication, we also control for co-authorship, dividing 
each article’s score by the square root of the number of co-authors, to capture the individual 
PES applicant’s contribution to each co-published article. Thus, an individual scientific 
production index is given by: 
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  where   is the number of articles published by a given professor  ,        the score of a 
given journal,  , and         refers to the number of co-authors for each published paper  . 
 
Table 3: Variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ips Publication score  6.303 6.130 0 40.593 
hens Teaching hours + administrative duties 210.342 61.931 54 512 
male =1 if male 0.779   0 1 
exp Years of experience  18.292 9.198 2 40 
exp2 Square of experience 418.833 388.789 4 1600 
hi0506 h-index during the previous period 6.525 5.976 0 44 
lcitun 
Citation index of researchers of the same 
university (logs) 2.439 0.843 0 4.617 
lcitun2 lcitun squared 6.659 4.257 0 21.319 
scorup 
=1 if the citation score of the university is 
increasing 0.321   0 1 
ratio Number of students/Number of teachers 19.860 2.139 14.709 27.425 
Fields of research 
jelBN 
History of Economic Thought and Economic 
History 0.050   0 1 
jelC Mathematical and Quantitative Methods 0.088   0 1 
JelD Microeconomics 0.092   0 1 
jelE Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics 0.167   0 1 
jelF International Economics 0.050   0 1 
jelG Financial Economics 0.071   0 1 
jelHK Public Economics and Law and Economics 0.067   0 1 
jelIJ 
Health, Education, and Welfare and Labor 
economics 0.088   0 1 
jelL Industrial Organization 0.117   0 1 
JelM 
Business Administration and Business 
Economics; Marketing; Accounting 0.050   0 1 
jelO 
Economic Development, Technological Change, 
and Growth 0.050   0 1 
jelQ 
Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; 
Environmental and Ecological Economics 0.067   0 1 
jelR 
Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation 
Economics 0.046   0 1 
 
   
  The descriptive statistics reveal the large dispersion of IPS scores, from 0 to 40.59 with a 
mean of 6.303. We also observe that the distribution of our scientific production index is 
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asymmetric: A very high proportion of professors have low scores and few researchers have 
very high scores (see Graph 2), in accordance with Lotka’s law. 
 
Graph 2: Distribution of the scientific production index 
 
 
Prior literature also has noted a Matthew’s effect, which refers to path dependency in 
scientific production scores. Therefore, we construct another scientific production index to 
take past production into account, using a lagged h index (Hirsch, 2005) to measure scientific 
output, weighted by the number of citations per publication between 1985 and the year 
preceding the competition. We again find a strong asymmetric distribution of researchers’ 
past h indexes, with a mean value of 6.52 and a large dispersion between 0 and 44. Finally, 
past scientific production could reflect unobservable research abilities, which is a key 
parameter of our principal–agent model.   
 
  The main originality of our dataset is to also identify pedagogical and administrative 
activities. For each professor, we measure the mean of annual teaching hours at the under-
graduated or graduated level (bachelor degree, master degree and PhD degree) in the last 
two academic years before the PES competition. Note that, in the French academic system, 
professors are civil servant and must teach at least 192 hours. Of course, they can choose to 
teach more. They then receive an additional salary, commensurate with the number of 
overtime hours performed. 
In addition to teaching duties, professors can be involved in managerial tasks. These 
administrative activities can be done at the department level (as dean of the department or 
of the scientific laboratory), at the university level (as being member of the University 
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council, such as President of the University) or at a national level (as being member of 
French National Council of Universities or of the National Scientific Research Committee, 
etc.). For all these duties, professors receive a premium, calculated as a given number of 
equivalent teaching hours (according to a national referential)1. To take into account the 
wide diversity in the educational and administrative investment, we decided to aggregate 
teaching hours and hours in administrative duties. The obtained index, denoted hens, varies 
between 54 and 512 hours per year with a mean value at 210 (see graph 3), a level very 
closed to the teaching statutory service. Note that, in our sample, 37% of the professors 
teach less than the conventional service (less than 192 hours). This could be explained by 
sabbatical vacancies, allowing professors to concentrate on their research project and to be 
exempted of any teaching duties for one semester or a complete year. 
 
Graph 3: Distribution of the teaching and administrative hours 
 
 
The descriptive statistics thus show great heterogeneity in professors’ investments in 
research and teaching. Some professors specialize in teaching or research; others are 
generalists. These types may reflect their individual abilities, which we denoted  and  in our 
theoretical framework. However, their abilities are often unobservable. Therefore, we 
propose to identify each professor’s type, according to his or her level of investment in each 
task, compared against the median investment observed in the sample. Thus, 
 • Generalists are those professors who achieve higher publication and teaching scores 
than the median. 
 • Research specialists are professors who score higher only on the publication side. 
                                                        
1
 For example, a President of an University receives a premium equivalent to 192 teaching hours. 
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 • Teaching specialists are those who score higher only on the teaching side, 
 • Professors who score lower than the median on both tasks are free riders. 
 
In addition to their scientific production and investment in teaching and administrative 
duties, our data reveal some individual attributes about the professors, as well as their fields 
of research, according to a set of dummies reflecting the JEL classifications of their 
publications. Following Rauber and Ursprung (2008), we anticipate that research fields might 
have two effects on scientific production. First, some fields could be more prolific because of 
their high concentration of scientists, large international networks, or complementarities 
with other fields (e.g., econometrics, game theory). Second, some research fields might have 
been enhanced by consulting activities in the private sector. Professors rationally might 
choose to devote more time to these lucrative activities than to academic publications. We 
also consider research fields as determinants of teaching hours. Interactions between 
research and teaching activities might induce some scope economies or, conversely, reduce 
teaching competencies. We thus wonder if it might be difficult to assign enough courses to 
ultra-specialist teachers in their fields of expertise. In contrast, professors with a broad 
research field (e.g., macroeconomics, microeconomics, public economics, quantitative 
techniques) could be asked more readily to teach the wide range of courses needed. 
 
Finally, we seek to identify whether scientific and pedagogical contexts influence the time 
devoted to research and teaching tasks. The PES data set does not directly reveal this 
information but instead indicates the institutional affiliation of each professor. With this 
information, we can collect additional data to identify the professors’ work contexts. First, to 
identify the scientific context, we use impact factors for French economic departments, as 
provided by Bosquet and Combes (2011). Departmental impact factors, denoted citun, refer 
to the sum of individual impact factors (production weighted by citations, based on Google 
Scholar) of all members during 2004–2008, or immediately before the PES competition. In 
addition to this static indicator, we use a dynamic measure of the departments in which the 
impact factor has increased most strongly (scoreup). Such a favorable evolution in the 
scientific context occurs among 35.5% of the departments observed in our sample.  
 
Second, to measure the teaching and administrative context, we mobilized data from the 
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French Ministry of Education about the number of students and number of professors per 
university (in 2010). We constructed a ratio of these two variables (variable “ratio” in Table 
3) that gives the number of students per professor.  
 
Graph 4 presents the distribution of scientific production scores and pedagogical duties 
according to the collective environment. For the scientific context, we define two 
departmental categories: high impact factors (25% highest scores) and low impact factors 
(25% lowest scores). For pedagogical context, we adopt the same method, according to the 
value of the ratio of students to professor. 
 
Graph 4: Distribution of tasks scores according to scientific and pedagogical contexts 
 
 
 
As Graph 4 clearly shows, the institutional context affects both individual scientific production 
and pedagogical investment. The median scientific score is about 8.22 when professors belong 
to the most productive departments, whereas it is only 5.05 for the least productive ones. 
Moreover, the average number of hours performed per year greater than 21 hours in 
understaffed teaching universities. These statistics argue for a more detailed study (especially 
with a ceteris paribus method) of the effect of context on multitasking. 
 
4. Estimations and discussion 
To identify the effect of the institutional context on professors’ duties, we consider two 
substitutive tasks that face professors, such that investing in one tasks determines the time 
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available to devote to the other task. In turn, we estimate the following the system of 
equations:  
 
                               
                               
  
where lips is the logarithm of scientific production index (ips), lhens is the logarithm of teaching 
hours (hens),     is a vector of individual attributes and   describes institutional context in 
research and pedagogy. 
 
To estimate this two-equation system, we solve a simultaneity problem that may cause a 
correlation in the error terms among the equations. We use a three-least squares estimation 
(Zellner and Theil, 1962), which adopts an instrumental variable approach to produce consistent 
estimates and generalized least squares (GLS) to account for the correlation structure in the 
disturbances across the two equations. We also control for heteroscedasticity with Greene’s 
(2007) method. Moreover, we performed a Hansen-Sargan overidentification test (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004; Baum et al., 2003), and we computed overall system R-square values 
(Greene, 2007). We estimate the two-equation system for the whole sample, and then 
separately for each type of professor (free-riders, research specialists, teaching specialists, 
generalists). Table 4 contains all the results.  
 
Regarding the estimates’ quality, the Hansen and Sargan overidentification test indicates that 
the models are well identified. The goodness of fit of our estimates is high (close to 80%), 
though somewhat lower for the free-riders segment (R2 = 0.52). Explaining the behavior of these 
professors appears relatively difficult, probably due to the strong influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
 The tasks are conflicting, as we predicted. When we consider the tasks simultaneously, we find 
that investing heavily in one activity limits the time available for other, except for among free 
riders. Teaching specialists often make a trade-off between teaching and publishing. Moreover, 
we observe that for both generalists and specialists, the between-task elasticities are 
asymmetric: The negative influence of teaching activities on scientific production is always 
stronger than the negative effect of publishing on pedagogical duties. 
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Table 4: Effects of the institutional context on professors’ tasks 
 
NB1: Standard deviations are given in brackets. A correction of heteroscedasticity is done following Greene (2007). 
NB2:***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; significant at 10%; ns: non significant 
lips lhens lips lhens lips lhens 	lips lhens 	lips lhens
-1.003	
(0.570*)
-0.012 0.141	
(0.019ns) (0.019***)
0.357 1.957	 0.151 -.021	 0.020	
(0.108***) (4.389ns) (0.016***) (0.062***) (0.013ns)
-0.254	 0.010	 -0.014	
(0.212ns) (0.003***) (0.003***)
0.004	
(0.002*)
-0.037	 -0.026	 -0.099 0.088	
(0.020*) (0.093ns) 	(0.021***) (0.015***)
-0.007	 -0.025	 0.042	
(0.087ns) (0.020ns) (0.015***)
-0.052 0.820	 0.024 -0.024	 0.052	 -0.062	
(0.015***) (1.118ns) (0.029ns) (0.015ns) (0.051ns) (0.012***)
0.141 3.661	 0.213	 0.043 -0.025	 -0.175	
(0.020**) (5.522ns) (0.037ns) 	(0.074ns) (0.017ns) (0.018***)
0.073	 0.002	
(0.086ns) (0.005ns)
0.313	
(2.103ns)
-0.695	
(1.286ns)
1.168	
(2.654ns)
-0.028	 0.024	 0.143	 6.683	 0.091	
(0.037ns) (0.053ns) (0.074*) (3.262**) (0.018***)
0.001	 -0.003	
(0.001ns) (0.002*)
3.906	 6.683	 4.426	
(0.730***) (3.262**) (0.183***)
Observations
R 2
Hansen-Sargan	test	value
59
0.846
19.289***
63
0.792
15.915**
61
0.798
16.003**
240
0.891
19.201***
57
0.524
16.994**
-0.002	
(0.0004***)
constant
13.330	
(3.154***)
5.127	
(0.219***)
76.974	
(160.532ns)
5.589	
(0.389***)
11.944	
(1.397***)
5.811	
(0.632***)
27.143	
(3.144***)
ratio2:	ratio 2
-0.001	
(0.0004**)
-0.0005	
(0.001ns)
-0.347	
(0.091***)
-0.226	
(0.055***)
ratio:	Student	per	professor
0.048	
(0.018***)
-0.258	
(0.023***)
-0.119	
(0.037***)
scorup:	great	increase	in	collective	impact	factor
-0.071	
(0.026***)
-0.070	
(0.037***)
1.003	
(0.103***)
0.541	
(0.174***)
citun2:	(citun)2
-0.045	
(0.014***)
-0.073	
(0.023***)
0.037	
(0.003***)
0.063	
(0.006***)
citun:	Department’s	citation	score
0.297	
(0.095***)
0.442	
(0.138***)
jelHK:	public	economics
0.524	
(0.070***)
0.769	
(0.076***)
0.344	
(0.053***)
0.346	
(0.075***)
hi0506:	Lagged	h-index
0.021	
(0.007***)
-0.152	
(0.029***)
0.220	
(0.063***)
jelE:	macroeconomics -0.043	(0.080ns)
-0.360	
(0.075***)
-0.174	
(0.028***)
-0.327	
(0.055***)
jelD:	microeconomics
0.678	
(0.069***)
0.178	
(0.021***)
9.334	
(14.878ns)
0.402	
(0.064***)
-0.306	
(0.093***)
-0.001	
(0.0003***)
0.0005	
(0.00006***)
jelC:	mathematics -0.073	(0.082ns)
7.641	
(14.529ns)
-0.488	
(0.109***)
-0.229	
(0.034***)
-1.335	
(0.109***)
-0.244	
(0.084***)
0.056	
(0.014***)
0.041	
(0.011***)
exp2:	exp2
0.0003	
(0.0002ns)
0.0001	
(0.00006**)
0.0004	
(0.0001***)
0.0004	
(0.0002**)
0.0002	
(0.0001**)
-0.002	
(0.0003***)
-0.0003	
(0.00006***)
exp:	experience
-0.039	
(0.011***)
-0.011	
(0.003***)
-0.025	
(0.007***)
-0.027	
(0.010***)
-0.012	
(0.005**)
-0.416	
(0.045***)
male
0.154	
(0.014***)
0.112	
(0.026***)
0.316	
(0.057***)
0.146	
(0.022***)
0.958	
(0.129***)
-5.090	
(0.599***)
lips
-0.245	
(0.015***)
-0.280	
(0.044***)
lhens
-2.295	
(0.579***)
-14.103	
(30.921ns)
-1.988	
(0.278***)
Full	sample Free-rider Specialist	in	research Specialist	in	teaching Generalist
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This result likely is a direct consequence of the statutory teaching hours (192 hours) and the 
asymmetric flexibility around this threshold value. Increasing teaching hours above this level 
is easy for each professor in the French academia, but it is less easy to perform less. Only 
professors who invest in administrative activities or defend a sabbatical can negotiate a 
reduction in their teaching duties. Moreover, when a professor receives an agreement to 
teach less during a given next academic year, his or her courses get affected to other 
professors, and there is no guarantee for the incumbent to recover these courses in the 
future. Not surprisingly, it is thus easier to adjust research activities when teaching tasks 
increase. Conversely, it seems to be harder to reduce teaching duties when a professor 
wants to invest more in research activities, demonstrating the existence of a ratcheting 
effect. 
  
Although research and pedagogical activities are substitutable for professors, they are 
complementary for universities (principals), which have an interest in seeing teachers do 
both tasks simultaneously. This divergence of interests between the principal and agents 
requires a better understanding of the determinants of investments in both tasks to design 
relevant incentive schemes. Our estimates identify precisely which variables explain such 
investments. They depend primarily on individual characteristics. Men invest more time, on 
average, in both tasks than women. Following Becker (1957), we might posit that female 
professors face more challenges in combining their professional activity with family 
responsibilities. However, the gender effect also differs according to professors’ types. For 
generalists for example, men show presents lower scientific production scores and 
equivalent teaching and administrative duties, perhaps as a result of gender differences in 
multitasking abilities (Criss, 2006). In this case, women might be more productive than men 
in multitasking activities, whereas men are globally more efficient because they specialize. 
 
Our results also confirm a negative impact of experience on both publication scores and 
pedagogical duties. A life cycle thus seems likely, in that experience consistently produces a 
negative effect that worsens over time in our data. This finding may appear surprising, but 
we note that our sample consists of only full professors, who all have substantial experience. 
We probably even miss the period of massive investment in scientific production that 
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professors undergo to maximize their chances of promotion and tenure or for greater 
remuneration in the early stages of their careers. 
 
We also find a path dependency effect among the publication scores: Professors with high 
past h indexes are more productive, in accordance with a Matthew effect for French 
economics professors. This effect could indicate that the most productive professors have 
easier access to funds, attract the best coauthors, and are recruited by the best laboratories. 
Because of their better research environments, they enjoy an advantage in scientific 
production. The Matthew effect also could mean that the most productive professors have 
specific research skills, which arise throughout their careers.  
 
Our results also extend findings by Rauber and Ursprung (2008), who concluded that 
research fields significantly affect scientific output. These fields also have an impact on the 
number of teaching hours, according to our findings. For example, specialists in public 
economics have a comparative advantage in the production of science and are frequently 
solicited to teach. This advantage could be attributed to the central role of this field in 
current economics research, as well as in economic policy (e.g., pollution issues, imperfect 
competition, social equity). 
 
Our results confirm the key prediction of our model: A dynamic scientific context (citun) 
favors individual scientific production by all professors, except for free riders. This finding 
also is consistent with the conclusions of economics of science theory; not only do we 
include the collective dimension of research, but we also account for multitasking. The 
positive effects of a dynamic research environment are stronger for teaching specialists and 
for generalists. The creation of agglomeration effects, as recommended by Aghion (2010), 
therefore can increase the scientific output of all professors, including those who initially do 
not have the strongest research abilities. The positive effects of a dynamic research 
environment seem to diminish gradually as the universities’ impact factors rise (citun2), as 
we expected. Agglomeration effects thus are characterized by diminishing returns. 
Moreover, a gradual implementation of these agglomeration effects appears preferable; 
belonging to a university that experiences a sharp increase (relative to the median) of its 
impact factor (scorup) actually is unfavorable for individual scientific output. This result may 
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emerge because the sudden improvement of an impact factor generally follows sweeping 
university governance reforms, such as mergers of research teams. These changes can 
create tensions and, at least in the short term, adversely affect scientific output. 
 
Moreover, teaching activities depend on the context. Working in an understaffed university 
(higher ratio of students per professor) significantly increases the number of teaching hours 
undertaken by a professor. This pedagogical context affects both generalists and teaching 
specialists; it does not change behaviors of research specialists or free riders. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the determinants of scientific production, including collective 
determinants related to the research environment, in the context of multitasking teachers. 
In this sense, we combine the key features of the economics of science with the economics 
of human resources.  
We propose a principal–agent model to understand how university professors divide their 
time between two substitutable tasks: publishing and teaching. Our theoretical framework 
predicts that professors devote more time to the task for which they have a marginal 
advantage. According to their abilities, they can be either generalists or specialists. However, 
the scientific context, and especially collective scientific production, strongly influences 
these optimal behaviors too. Thus, a dynamic context characterized by a high stock of 
knowledge in the research lab or university improves individual publication scores by 
creating positive knowledge externalities. 
To test these predictions, we used French data from administrative sources. This original 
data set enables us to observe both scientific production and pedagogical duties. Our results 
also confirm that these tasks are conflicting and that the institutional context affects the 
activity choices that professors make.  
Finally, we conclude that universities, or the principals in our principal–agent framework, 
can influence the activities of their agents (professors) by implementing appropriate 
incentive schemes, such as assigning professors to the tasks for which they are inherently 
more talented. They also can play on collective research aspects by favoring dynamic 
scientific contexts (including agglomeration effects) that increase scientific output in total. 
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Appendix  
 
Suppose that   defines the wage that an agent receives. Payments are equal for all 
outcomes, so the individual rationality constraint becomes                     . 
This constraint must be binding, so     
                   
If we define      , the principal must solve the following problem: 
   
 
                                   
The first order condition of this problem is: 
 
   
 
 
     
                            
 
The resolution is equivalent when we introduce scientific externalities. In this case, the 
principal’s problem is given by:  
   
 
                                   
and the first-order condition becomes:  
     
 
     
                          
 
 
 
